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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
Amici are law professors who specialize in evidence 
and criminal law and procedure.1  As legal academics, 
amici have an interest in the consistent and correct 
application of the rules of evidence, and in reconciling 
those rules with the constitutional right to a fair trial.  
The brief is joined by the following professors:  
Barbara Allen Babcock, Judge John Crown 
Professor of Law, Emerita, Stanford Law School.  
Jeffrey Bellin, Cabell Research Professor of Law, 
William and Mary Law School.  
Robert P. Burns, William W. Gurley Memorial 
Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
Sherman J. Clark, Kirkland & Ellis Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
James E. Coleman, Jr., John S. Bradway Professor 
of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law.  																																																								
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel or party 
authored this brief in whole or part. Duke University School of Law 
supports faculty research and scholarship, and that financial support 
contributed to the costs of preparing this brief. Otherwise, no person 
or entity apart from the amici and their counsel made any monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this 
brief. Duke University is not a signatory to the brief, and the views 
expressed here are solely those of the amici. The parties’ letters of 
consent to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk’s 
Office. 
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Lisa Kern Griffin, Professor of Law, Duke 
University School of Law.  
Robert P. Mosteller, J. Dickson Phillips 
Distinguished Professor of Law, UNC School of Law.  
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Professor of Law, 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II Professor of 
Law and Professor of Psychology, Duke University School 
of Law.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The petition raises the question whether the rules 
prohibiting juror impeachment should give way to 
constitutional concerns when a jury member comes 
forward with evidence of racially or ethnically biased 
statements made during deliberations about a criminal 
defendant’s guilt. The question is an important one that 
has deeply divided both federal and state courts. See Pet. 
App. 23a n.4 (Marquez, J., dissenting). 
Applying this Court’s previous decisions on the 
scope of Rule 606(b) will not resolve the split in authority 
going forward. In two previous cases, the Court has not 
found fair trial concerns significant enough to override 
Rule 606(b), but it has left open the question at issue 
here. Both the substance and the structure of the juror 
statements made in this case distinguish it from this 
Court’s earlier decisions. Tanner v. United States, 483 
U.S. 107, 127 (1987), concerned juror competency rather 
than juror prejudice. In Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 
(2014), the Court addressed a juror’s partiality in a 
matter “internal” to deliberations and ordinarily covered 
by Rule 606(b), but that case did not involve bigotry 
specifically directed at a criminal defendant. Moreover, 
the Warger decision noted that “[t]here may be cases of 
juror bias so extreme” that the no-impeachment rule could 
give way. 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3. This Court should now 
recognize that explicit racial or ethnic prejudice against a 
criminal defendant falls into this category, resolving the 
existing conflict. The balance of interests is markedly 
different in such cases than in Tanner or Warger.    
First, the fundamental unfairness of a guilty 
verdict tainted by racial prejudice raises particularly 
acute constitutional concerns. In this case, the right to a 
fair criminal trial, its essential component of an impartial 
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jury, and the grave threat to impartiality that racial or 
ethnic bias poses all converge. See Wright v. United 
States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“If a 
criminal defendant could show that the jury was racially 
prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without 
trampling the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a fair 
trial and an impartial jury.”). Indeed, racial or ethnic 
prejudice against a defendant abridges the fair trial right 
almost “by definition.” Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3.  
Second, juror testimony is likely to be the only 
available evidence to establish such prejudice. The “usual 
safeguards” this Court has pointed to in prior cases are 
not “sufficient to protect the integrity of the process” in 
cases of racial or ethnic bias. Id. Moreover, the 
administrability concerns that arise with general claims 
of juror dishonesty or partiality are not present in the 
narrower and clearer context of expressly racist 
considerations. The impairment in Tanner was also of a 
type that could be exposed through means other than 
reliance on juror testimony. Intoxication may be 
observable during the trial and is a potential subject of 
testimony by non-jurors. Similarly, the kind of bias at 
issue in Warger—a juror’s “views about negligence 
liability for car crashes” that resulted from a prior 
accident involving her daughter, id. at 529—is more likely 
to be discernable from external evidence or revealed 
during voir dire than racial or ethnic prejudice against a 
defendant.  
Third, the experience of jurisdictions that have 
admitted juror testimony on the limited question of racial 
or ethnic bias suggests that consistently recognizing the 
exception will not unduly infringe on juror privacy or 
meaningfully burden the courts. The concern about 
bigotry has some self-limiting mechanisms. Courts have 
continued to apply the no-impeachment rule unless 
statements are overtly racist, objectively verifiable, and 
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focused on a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 606(b), courts already 
consider juror testimony on “extraneous prejudicial 
information” such as media accounts and “outside 
influences” such as threats and bribes. Although the 
statements of ethnic animus at issue in this case occurred 
“during the jury’s deliberations” within the meaning of 
the rule, an additional constitutional exception can be 
administered just as the enumerated exceptions are. The 
initial factual question is an objective one: whether a 
racist comment pertaining to the case was uttered. In 
addition, with regard to a juror’s racial or ethnic prejudice 
against a defendant, courts need not inquire into the 
statement’s effect on internal mental processes in order to 
address the issue of a remedy.  
Finally, the policy justifications for Rule 606(b) are 
not served by applying it in this context. Permitting 
verdicts tainted by racial or ethnic bias to remain in place 
in the interest of “finality” does profound harm to the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, public confidence in 
the “integrity” of adjudication declines when racial or 
ethnic prejudice comes to light but evidentiary rules bar 
its consideration. A criminal defendant’s right to assert 
that the jury deliberations were racially tainted currently 
depends on the jurisdiction in which the case arises. 
Leaving potentially unconstitutional verdicts entirely 
“beyond effective reach” in some jurisdictions will only 
promote “irregularity and injustice.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), 
Advisory Committee Note to subdivision (b). This Court 
has long recognized that there must be a measure of 
flexibility in the no-impeachment rule because cases 
might arise in which its rigid application violates “the 
plainest principles of justice.” McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 
264, 269 (1915); see also Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3. 
The alleged prejudice at issue here presents such a case.   
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE PARAMOUNT CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERN WITH RACIAL OR ETHNIC 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS SHOULD OVERRIDE THE 
EVIDENTIARY BAR TO IMPEACHMENT BY 
JUROR TESTIMONY. 
 
This case arises at the intersection of the Sixth 
Amendment fair trial guarantee and the difficult and 
lasting problem of racial prejudice among jurors. Racial or 
ethnic bias is an “especially pernicious” form of prejudice 
in the criminal justice process to which this Court applies 
special scrutiny. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 
(1979); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 
(1992) (a defendant has “a right to an impartial jury that 
can view him without racial animus, which so long has 
distorted our system of criminal justice”); Holland v. 
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting the Court’s “unceasing efforts to eradicate racial 
prejudice from our criminal justice system”). 
The Court has been vigilant, for example, about 
state-sponsored prejudice when prosecutors exercise 
peremptory challenges of jurors for racially 
discriminatory reasons. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 88 (1986); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 
238 (2005) (“When the government’s choice of jurors is 
tainted with racial bias,” then “the very integrity of the 
courts is jeopardized.”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 
(1991) (“The jury acts as a vital check against wrongful 
exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors. The 
intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selection 
process damages both the fact and the perception of this 
guarantee.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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The Court should be no less vigilant when 
allegations arise that overt racial or ethnic prejudice has 
tainted a jury’s guilty verdict. Cf. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 
62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (cautioning against “exalting 
the rights of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the 
criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not 
the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death”). 
Indeed, “the constitutional interests of the affected party 
are at their strongest when a jury employs racial bias in 
reaching its verdict.” 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor 
James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6074, at 
513 (2d ed. 2007).  
In this case involving sexual assault and 
harassment, a seated juror argued during deliberations 
that “Mexican men take whatever they want,” Pet. App. 
4a., that “Mexican men had a bravado that caused them 
to believe they could do whatever they wanted with 
women,” id., that “Mexican men [are] physically 
controlling of women because they have a sense of 
entitlement,” id., and that the juror’s experience in law 
enforcement suggested that “nine times out of ten 
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward 
women and young girls.” Id.  
The focused prejudice here represents a much more 
substantial defect in the proceedings than the bias at 
issue in the Warger case. When partiality comes in the 
form of racial or ethnic prejudice, it “undermines the 
jury’s ability to perform its function as a buffer against 
governmental oppression and, in fact, converts the jury 
itself into an instrument of oppression.” Wright & Gold § 
6074, at 513. Racial animus, moreover, raises particularly 
significant constitutional issues in criminal cases, which 
is a context that Warger did not present. See Rose, 443 
U.S. at 563.  
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), though otherwise 
applicable to the statements of jurors during 
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deliberations, should yield to these constitutional 
concerns when it shields racially motivated factfinders. As 
this Court has previously stated, “no right ranks higher 
than the right of the accused to a fair trial,” Press-Enter. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984), and “the 
inestimable privilege of trial by jury” underlies “the whole 
administration of criminal justice.” Holland, 493 U.S. at 
511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The guarantee of an 
impartial jury “goes to the very integrity of the legal 
system.” Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987). 
Fundamental fairness depends on factfinders who are free 
from any “predisposition about the defendant’s 
culpability.” Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 
(1989). Jurors are not “impartial” in the “constitutional 
sense of that term” if they have “strong and deep 
impressions” that “close the mind against the testimony 
that may be offered in opposition to them.” United States 
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807); see also 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 (1966) (per curiam) 
(“[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 
10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors”); Aldridge v. 
United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 (1931) (A “gross 
injustice” is perpetrated if a juror “entertain[s] a prejudice 
which would preclude his rendering a fair verdict.”); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879) 
(Prejudices against “particular classes” that “sway the 
judgment of jurors” “deny to persons of those classes the 
full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy.”). 
In construing the common law precursor to 606(b), 
the Court has held that the no-impeachment rule must be 
sufficiently pliable to accommodate the interests of 
justice. See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269; see also Clark v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933); United States v. 
Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851). This conclusion is 
consonant with the Court’s broader jurisprudence about 
conflicts between fair trial rights and exclusionary rules. 
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When evidentiary bars “insulate from discovery the 
violation of constitutional rights,” they may “themselves 
violate those rights.” Wright & Gold § 6074, at 513. 
Accordingly, the Court has also held that the rules of 
evidence must give way when they preclude “the 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” 
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 331 (2006); 
see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (“In 
these unique circumstances, ‘the hearsay rule may not be 
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.’”) 
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973)); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (“The 
State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a 
juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding of so 
vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-
examination for bias of an adverse witness.”). 
When the Court balances competing interests to 
determine whether a defendant’s fair trial rights should 
override an evidentiary exclusion, the central question is 
whether “the interests served by a rule justify the 
limitation imposed on a defendant’s constitutional right.” 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987). The policy 
interests behind enforcement of Rule 606(b) are simply “at 
their weakest” in cases of jury bias involving racial 
prejudice. See Wright & Gold § 6074, at 513. Because 
racial or ethnic animus by jurors poses a particular 
danger to fair trial rights, the Rule 606(b) bar should not 
preclude consideration of juror testimony about the 
narrow category of statements expressly revealing such 
prejudice during deliberations. 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS 
ADDRESSING THE SCOPE OF EXCEPTIONS TO 
606(B) WILL NOT RESOLVE THE CONFLICT 
CONCERNING JUROR TESTIMONY ABOUT 
RACIAL OR ETHNIC BIAS. 
 
This Court’s previous decisions declining to permit 
juror testimony on statements during deliberations 
depend on alternate mechanisms for revealing sources of 
unfairness that will not work effectively in instances of 
racial or ethnic bias. The Tanner Court envisioned safety 
valves through which alleged biases could still be revealed 
and addressed: surface protections like external 
observation and the voir dire process, as well as non-juror 
or pre-verdict evidence of misconduct. The Colorado 
Supreme Court, and those courts that have adopted a 
similar approach, have relied on these safeguards to 
conclude that the Tanner protections are “also available to 
expose racial biases.” United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 
1230, 1240 (CA10 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1051 
(2009).  
Visual observation by the judge, counsel, or court 
personnel, however, can do little to bring racial or ethnic 
bias to light. Incompetence and prejudice reveal 
themselves differently. For example, non-jurors are 
unlikely witnesses to prejudicial statements about a 
defendant, even though they can often testify to 
misconduct like intoxication. Racial prejudice also lies 
especially well hidden. The bias at issue in Warger—a 
juror’s sympathy with a defendant who had caused a car 
accident—might have been established through objective 
evidence about her personal history, or through 
statements that she made outside of the jury room. But 
evidence outside of the jury deliberations is unlikely to 
reveal a juror’s racially discriminatory reaction to the 
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evidence at trial. Although there could be indications of 
animus such as membership in certain groups, complaints 
involving other racial discrimination, or past behavior 
towards individuals of other races or ethnicities, those 
external signals would not necessarily link to invidious 
discrimination against a criminal defendant. 
The voir dire process, moreover, is even less likely 
to uncover racial or ethnic prejudice in jurors. Voir dire 
questioning might expose incentives like the Warger 
juror’s potential identification with the defendant because 
of her daughter’s experience. Nothing inhibited the 
Warger juror from freely expressing her views about 
liability for car accidents during voir dire. When it comes 
to racial or ethnic bias, a juror can hardly be expected to 
acknowledge that he harbors some prejudice. A juror 
“may have an interest in concealing his own bias” or may 
even be “unaware of it.” See McDonough Power Equip., 
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); see also Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, 
American Juries: The Verdict 91 (2007); Maria Krysan, 
Privacy and the Expression of White Racial Attitudes: A 
Comparison Across Three Contexts, 62 Public Opinion 
Quarterly 506, 507-09 (1998) (describing experiments on 
social pressure to conform to norms against prejudice). 
“Some jurors will intentionally deceive the courts, 
perhaps because they are ashamed to admit attitudes 
that are socially unfashionable or even because they 
might welcome the chance to seek retaliation against a 
litigant.” Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving 
“Its Wonderful Power”, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 554 (1975). 
And “the more prejudiced or bigoted the jurors, the less 
they can be expected to confess forthrightly and candidly 
their state of mind in open court.” Id.  
Indeed, the present case provides a self-contained 
demonstration. During the voir dire process, prospective 
jurors were repeatedly asked routine questions about 
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whether they could be “fair” and whether they had 
feelings “for or against” petitioner. Pet. App. 3a. No juror 
acknowledged any racial or ethnic bias. Id. Two of the 
seated jurors have since alleged that in the intimacy and 
relative familiarity of the jury room, and in the absence of 
authority figures and public scrutiny, a juror made 
repeated statements to the effect that the jury should 
convict the defendant “because he’s Mexican.” Pet. App. 
4a. Overt bias was thus intertwined with the juror’s view 
of the defendant’s culpability. When a “grave” case such 
as this arises, the sole mechanism for addressing the bias 
is likely to be consideration of statements made during 
deliberations and brought to light by a juror after the 
verdict. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (CA1 
2009).  
Although courts applying Rule 606(b) to potential 
racial or ethnic bias point to the possibility that jurors can 
express concerns about deliberations prior to the verdict, 
that rarely occurs. See Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 
1144, 1155 (D.C. 2013); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 
N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991). As in this case, jurors 
typically come forward only after a verdict is rendered. 
The surface protections set forth in Tanner thus will not 
suffice to protect Sixth Amendment rights because post-
verdict juror testimony is likely to be “the only available 
evidence to establish racist juror misconduct.” Racist 
Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
1595, 1596 (1988). Accordingly, when a criminal 
defendant proffers juror testimony pointing to a racially 
discriminatory verdict, courts should be permitted to 
consider that evidence. 
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III. A NARROW EXCEPTION FOR CONSIDERATION 
OF JUROR TESTIMONY ABOUT 
DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS AS TO A 
DEFENDANT’S GUILT OR INNOCENCE IS 
WORKABLE AND CONSONANT WITH 
EXISTING EXCEPTIONS TO 606(B). 
 
 A narrow constitutional exception to consider juror 
testimony on racial or ethnic bias will not meaningfully 
increase the burden on jurors or on courts. The 
jurisdictions adhering to the no-impeachment rule in 
cases of such bias express traditional concerns with 
undermining finality, disrupting privacy, and inviting 
juror harassment. But despite admission of impeachment 
in many courts, there has been no “barrage of postverdict 
scrutiny of juror conduct.” Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21. 
Many jurisdictions are already hospitable to juror 
impeachment on the question of racial or ethnic bias, and 
their experience suggests that the courts can readily sort 
and evaluate such claims when they arise. Three federal 
courts of appeals and seven state courts of last resort 
have held that no-impeachment rules should not preclude 
consideration of a juror’s racially prejudiced statements 
offered to establish a violation of the constitutional right 
to a fair trial. See, e.g., Kittle, 65 A.3d at 1153 nn.9 &10. 
Permitting juror impeachment on these issues does not 
appear to have increased post-verdict juror harassment, 
has not opened the door to juror testimony beyond a 
subset of cases involving invidious discrimination directed 
at the defendant, and has not required courts to evaluate 
mental processes within the jury deliberations.  
Jurors’ post-trial interactions with counsel and 
investigators would be little altered by broader 
application of the constitutional exception. In states that 
recognize the exception, as in states that do not, juror 
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contact rules and ethical canons already discourage 
parties from seeking juror statements after trial. The 
Colorado Code of Professional Conduct, for example, 
prohibits post-discharge communications with jurors that 
involve “misrepresentation, coercion, duress or 
harassment.” Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.5(c)(3). In fact, the 
present case arose because two jurors voluntarily 
expressed their misgivings about the deliberations. 
Rather than protecting the reporting jurors, a strict 
construction of the rule frustrated their efforts to expose 
the possibility of a tainted verdict. 
Moreover, inherent limiting principles circumscribe 
the cases in which an exception for racist statements 
would be applicable. Even the courts that have recognized 
a constitutional override in cases of alleged prejudice only 
hear testimony when the statements directly relate to the 
Sixth Amendment concern by implicating objective facts 
about the case. The Sixth Amendment issue arises when 
the juror’s statements are linked with consideration of the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence and “received and utilized 
by the jury in an evidentiary context.” Smith v. Brewster, 
444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978). The scope of the 
constitutional exception is thus narrow. It applies only to 
specific racial or ethnic animus pertaining to the 
defendant and applied to the substance of the case. 
Accordingly, comments made by jurors to non-jurors, 
Wright, 559 F. Supp. at 1129, statements to non-
deliberating jurors, United States v. Shalhout, 507 Fed. 
Appx. 201, 207 (CA3 2012), and offhand remarks after a 
verdict had already been reached, Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 
827 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (CA7 1987), have all been held 
inadmissible. 
The statements in question must also be subject to 
corroboration. See Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874) 
(“If one [juror] affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven 
can deny.”). The California Evidence Code, for example, 
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permits juror testimony about statements made during 
deliberations, but only with regard to statements that 
give rise to a presumption of misconduct just because they 
were uttered. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1150(a); In re 
Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 398 (1985). The California 
courts have rejected speculative claims or subjective 
impressions of prejudice. Id. In many jurisdictions that 
permit juror impeachment to address racial prejudice, 
courts have similarly declined to review statements of 
bias that do not relate to “specific readily identifiable facts 
or actions as opposed to evidence of subjective mental 
attitudes on the part of a juror.” Laguer, 571 N.E. 2d at 
376; see also United States v. Brassler, 651 F.2d 600, 603 
(CA8 1981); People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ill. 
1978). A constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) thus 
would only render testimony about racist statements 
admissible when that testimony can be proven or 
disproven. The objective verifiability of the evidence 
alleviates any concern with juror fraud or the possibility 
that a disgruntled juror could invent misconduct.  
Furthermore, only overtly racist statements 
directed at the evidence—not stray remarks, insults 
exchanged between jurors, or even indications of general 
bigotry unrelated to the defendant—would render 
statements during deliberations admissible. See Villar, 
586 F.3d at 87; Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. at 206-07. 
Despite the permissive approach to juror impeachment in 
the California rules, for example, courts there have held 
that the statements in question must constitute more 
than mere suggestions of racist thinking. See People v. 
Steele, 4 P.3d 225, 248 (Cal. 2002). Accordingly, courts 
have rejected testimony concerning general references to 
racial stereotypes during deliberations, as well as alleged 
statements equally applicable to gang membership or 
racial status. See People v. Ali, 2013 WL 452901, at *19 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013).  
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These screening mechanisms are similar to the 
ones that courts use when confronted with allegations of 
external influences on jury deliberations, which are 
already admissible pursuant to Rule 606(b)(2). Granting 
review of evidence of racial or ethnic bias thus will not 
upset the existing balance between exposing juror 
misconduct and shoring up the finality and legitimacy of 
verdicts. As with allegations of racially-tainted remarks, 
claims of external influence are subject to corroboration 
and refutation. The only initial question is whether the 
information was received or the influence occurred. 
Impact on the verdict is a separate inquiry.  
Faced, for example, with an allegation of bribery or 
receipt of extraneous information, a court first allows 
testimony to determine whether the act occurred. See, 
e.g., Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 
914, 917 (CA7 1991) (proper procedure is to establish 
“whether the communication was made and what it 
contained” “without asking the jurors anything further 
and emphatically without asking them what role the 
communication played in their thoughts or discussion”). 
The same basic objective analysis applies when 
allegations arise that jurors made racially prejudiced 
statements. Courts need only determine “whether the 
communication was made and what it contained.” Id. 
They make no subjective inquiry into the role that the 
communication played in deliberations. 
Therefore, broader recognition of a constitutional 
exception would encompass only the objectively verifiable 
statements of a juror and would not require examination 
of the internal mental processes that Rule 606(b) was 
drafted to protect. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), Advisory 
Committee Note (the rule shields “mental operations and 
emotional reactions” during the jury’s deliberative 
process); see also Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 
1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing “objective evidence of 
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matters improperly introduced and considered by the jury 
in its verdict”). Courts need not analyze the jury’s actual 
reasoning process or engage in an ex post assessment of 
whether the jury was affected by the racist assertions.  
This is so in evaluating a remedy for the violation 
as well as its existence. The issue of remedy is not before 
the Court, as the only question presented is whether the 
evidence of bias lies behind the 606(b) shield. Rule 606(b) 
clearly states that it “does not purport to specify the 
substantive grounds for setting aside verdicts for 
irregularity.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), Advisory Committee 
Note. Under either of the approaches currently employed, 
however, the remedial step will not implicate the jury’s 
reasoning process in deliberations. 
Under one approach, many lower courts have 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment right is violated “if 
even one member of the jury harbors racial prejudice.” 
United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (CA7 1973). 
According to this view, proven racial bias on the part of a 
juror constitutes “a structural defect not subject to 
harmless error analysis.” State v. Phillips, 927 A.2d 931, 
934-36 (Conn. App. 2007); see also State v. Santiago, 715 
A.2d 1, 20 (Conn. 1998) (“Allegations of racial bias on the 
part of a juror are fundamentally different from other 
types of juror misconduct because such conduct is, ipso 
facto, prejudicial.”). That conclusion would be consistent 
with this Court’s holding in Gray that jury impartiality is 
“so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error.” 481 U.S. at 668 (quoting 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). 
Under a second approach, whether or not to grant a 
new trial has generally turned on the “substantial 
likelihood that the alleged racial slur would have made a 
difference in the outcome.” Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1158-59; 
see also Commonwealth v. McCowen, 939 N.E.2d 735, 
765-66 (Mass. 2010). In making that determination about 
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remedy, courts confronting statements of racial bias have 
also looked to external indications like the jury’s decision 
to acquit on some charges, Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. at 
207, or overwhelming evidence of guilt that reduces 
concern about racial bias infecting a verdict. Fields v. 
Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1006-07 (CA9 2002). Unlike the 
admissibility inquiry, which looks only to the objective 
existence of the racial or ethnic prejudice and the nature 
and timing of the statements in question, the remedial 
step accounts for extrinsic indications of the impact on the 
verdict. 
This approach would involve the same burden-
shifting framework that operates when there are 
allegations of extraneous prejudicial information under 
Rule 606(b)(2). See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 
F.3d 490, 497 (CADC 1996) (questioning whether there is 
a reasonable possibility that the outside intrusion affected 
the verdict). Once the defendant establishes, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the jury was exposed 
to racially biased statements that infected the judicial 
process, the burden shifts to the state to show that there 
was no prejudice. The judge then considers “the probable 
effect” of the statements “on a hypothetical average jury.” 
McCowen, 939 N.E.2d at 766; see also, e.g., Villar, 586 
F.3d at 87 (district court determined on remand that the 
verdict was not tainted by the racially discriminatory 
statements and could stand). 
 Petitioner would likely be entitled to a new trial in 
this case regardless of the remedial approach. The juror’s 
statements were “directly tied to the determination of the 
defendant’s guilt.” Pet. App. 26a (Marquez, J., dissenting). 
A juror allegedly stated, on more than one occasion during 
deliberations, that he believed the defendant was guilty 
“because he’s Mexican.” Pet. App. 4a. Petitioner’s case 
was close and dependent on a problematic identification, 
and the jury indicated initial deadlock on all four charges. 
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Moreover, the case turned in important respects on the 
credibility of an alibi witness whose testimony the juror at 
the center of this appeal discredited after (erroneously) 
labeling the alibi witness an “illegal.” Pet. App. 4a-5a; Tr. 
14 (Feb. 25, 2010).  
The bias expressed here is severe, focused on the 
defendant’s ethnicity, and clearly connected with 
consideration of the facts of the case. The trial court in 
fact acknowledged that the juror testimony exposed 
prejudice in the deliberations, but then ruled that the bias 
could not support a new trial because of the no-
impeachment rule. Tr. 3 (July 20, 2010). 
 In future cases in which a defendant likewise 
proffers juror impeachment involving blatant expressions 
of racism inserted into jury deliberations as an argument 
in favor of guilt, every court should have access to the 
relevant testimony. There is no reason to think that 
jurors are forfeiting meaningful protections in such a 
case, or that courts are incapable of screening for 
legitimate constitutional claims.  
 
IV. THE POLICIES SUPPORTING 606(B) ARE BEST 
SERVED BY ALLOWING JUROR TESTIMONY 
IN CASES OF ALLEGED RACIAL OR ETHNIC 
BIAS. 
 
The Colorado Supreme Court’s 4-3 decision in this 
case turned in large part on the policy implications of 
recognizing a constitutional exception to Rule 606(b). See 
Pet. App. 13a-15a. To be sure, the rule may give effect to 
concerns about intrusion into the jury room and public 
confidence in the finality of verdicts. Because of the 
nature of the statements at issue, however, there are 
important institutional interests that counsel in favor of 
permitting inquiry into alleged statements of racial or 
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ethnic prejudice. That inquiry could support not only the 
accuracy of criminal verdicts and the unbiased 
administration of justice, but also the integrity and 
legitimacy of the jury system as a whole.  
Concern with “chilling” jury deliberations has no 
force when racist speech is at issue. In addition, jurors 
neither expect nor enjoy complete privacy. Rule 606(b) has 
always permitted non-juror testimony, as well as the use 
of pre-verdict statements. The rule further allows post-
verdict testimony about external influences even by 
jurors, and it does not address juror revelations outside of 
court. “Juror journalism” and public discussion about jury 
service is not uncommon in high profile cases. The 
Colorado court’s construction of the rule thus permits 
wide reporting in the public domain of racially prejudiced 
statements by jurors while precluding any redress in 
court. 
 Perhaps the strongest arguments favoring strict 
interpretation of Rule 606(b) concern the validity of jury 
decisionmaking itself, but those also lack force when 
weighed against the harm of racial or ethnic bias. It is 
true that jury discussions might, upon close scrutiny, fall 
short of ideals about the deliberative process. Jury 
perfection remains an “untenable goal.” Benally, 546 F.3d 
at 1240. Racial prejudice is among the most dangerous of 
the jury’s imperfections, however, and when it reveals 
itself openly, confronting the available evidence will do 
more to preserve the institution of the jury than ignoring 
it. 
Indeed, the injury of racist factfinding is not 
limited to the criminal defendant deprived of a fair trial. 
As this Court has recognized, prejudice causes injury “to 
the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the 
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected 
in the process of our courts.” Rose, 443 U.S. at 556. A rigid 
interpretation of Rule 606(b) in the face of allegations of 
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racial or ethnic bias affects not only the fundamental 
fairness of the trial but the appearance of fairness in the 
public eye. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49 (“One of the 
goals of our jury system is to impress upon the criminal 
defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of 
conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law 
by persons who are fair.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (stating 
that the “harm from discriminatory jury selection extends 
beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded 
juror to touch the entire community” and “undermine 
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice”).  
When a decision is based on bigotry, removing the 
deliberations from the court’s purview does nothing to 
preserve the integrity of the jury. Both defendants and 
society may become aware of express juror prejudice 
through post-trial disclosures, and then look to the court 
to determine the constitutional significance of that bias. 
Only in some jurisdictions does that assessment occur, 
however, and this Court should resolve the split and 
ensure consistent consideration of juror testimony as to 
racially biased statements by jurors about a criminal 
defendant’s guilt.  
If “‘smoking guns’ are ignored, we have little hope 
of combating the more subtle forms of racial 
discrimination” in the criminal justice system. Wilkerson 
v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Although this Court has recognized that the 
jury system might not survive “efforts to perfect it,” 
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120, neither can it survive efforts to 
protect it by shielding racial prejudice from review. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of 
certiorari should be granted.  
 
